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Book review: The Renaissance of Astronomy

Writer: Michal J A Paszkiewicz
Michal J A Paszkiewicz
12 minutes ago
58 min read

A book review of Noel Swerdlow's "The Renaissance of Astronomy"


Noel Swerdlow (1941-2021) was a highly respected historian of astronomy, focusing on mathematical astronomy. His new book, The Renaissance of Astronomy (2026), is a much-anticipated work that was published after his death. It is his magnum opus, covering the period from Regiomontanus to Galileo and discussing the complex history of what Swerdlow saw as the rebirth of mathematical astronomy. So when I received a 1,075 page PDF review copy of his dense, equation‑laden history, the prospect of reading it on a screen was hopeless; I needed something more workable.

The full 1075 pages bound. The volumes are split by chapter - Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Tycho, Kepler, Galileo. The authors interests are clear by the relative widths.
The full 1075 pages bound. The volumes are split by chapter - Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Tycho, Kepler, Galileo. The authors interests are clear by the relative widths.

I hand bound the book, splitting it into volumes, each containing one of the 5 chapters - Regiomontanus, Copernicus, Tycho, Kepler, and Galileo. The moment this was done, it was already clear where the focus was, from the widths of these volumes. Tycho, who was one of the most prolific writers of all astronomers of his time, had the shortest text. In terms of text length, Kepler came first, followed by Galileo, Regiomontanus, and Copernicus, while Tycho received only 90 pages.


Later in the text, Swerdlow suggests that his goal was to delve into the minds of heliocentrists such as Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, to comprehend the era from their viewpoint. It is a shame that this context is absent from the preface, as it is this framework that gives the book its greatest strength. Regiomontanus was entirely a geocentrist, but Swerdlow saw him as the direct precursor of Copernicus, providing the astronomical mathematics required for rearranging the heavents. The chapter about Tycho is brief, which is logical in this context, as Swerdlow believes that Kepler and Galileo dismissed Tycho's authority, even though most of the other astronomers of the time admired him and adhered to his views. Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo are treated with great detail and hefty mathematical analysis. As I read the text, I realised that the chapters are themselves so distinct that splitting them into volumes made good sense. For the same reason, I think that this review should be split in the same way, as many of my comments on one chapter are entirely unrelated to the others, and to the work as a whole.

Regiomontanus

The preface makes Swerdlow's estimation of Regiomontanus clear. It states that Swerdlow

made clear that Copernicus owed his mastery of Ptolemaic planetary theory, and more, to the Epitome of the Almagest begun by Georg Peuerbach and elaborated and finished by Johannes Regiomontanus. If Regiomontanus had not fiddled, he argued, Copernicus could not have danced.

Swerdlow's alleged triumph in proving this against Edward Rosen's opposition, is highlighted as a pivotal moment in Swerdlow's career and evidently continues to be a crucial element of Swerdlow's thesis. Swerdlow's introduction to the book is solely a translation of an oration that Regiomontanus delivered in Padua in a reading of al-Farghānī. With this in mind, we dive into a chapter that wastes no time in becoming technically demanding. By page 16 the readers without a technical academic background will already start dropping out. Regiomontanus is clearly presented as a continuation of an already existing tradition of astronomy, but one where the mathematical methods were undernourished. The landscape wasn't wholly Ptolemaic, as Swerdlow acknowledges in mentioning Heinrich von Langenstein, who attempted to replace the epicyclic model with concentric spheres. Regiomontanus, the author writes "referred to Peuerbach, and only Peuerbach, as his teacher". His training, believed to be mostly self-taught, is examined in detail, with informed guesses about which textbooks were fundamental to his studies. Peurbach's lectures are argued to have largely superseded the available texts, meaning that Regiomontanus had already started his career on the bleeding edge of astronomical research. Peuerbach's lineage is directly continued by Regiomontanus, who kept the promise to Peuerbach by completing his Epitome of the Almagest around 1462. The Epitome wasn't just an abridgment, Swerdlow writes, it was a

recasting of the treatise, dividing its parts "in the manner of geometers", in the form of propositions in which theorems are proved.

The author seems to suggest that this work is the spark that allowed astronomy to grow in mathematical maturity. Swerdlow works through the various proofs, theories, and advances made in the Epitome, which at this point act as a useful introduction to Ptolemaic astronomy for any readers that may be mathematically proficient but lack a background in astronomy. The book then discusses Regiomontanus' criticism of the astronomy of his time, such as the fact that the positions of planets considerably differed from predictions (such as Mars differing by up to 2°) and that the eclipse of 17th December 1461 occurred an hour earlier than computed. Regiomontanus called for a reform of the entire field of astronomy. Regiomontanus proclaimed the mathematical sciences to be the highest of all studies and essential to every art. Regiomontanus must have had incredible patience and an eye for detail. Swerdlow shows this in the fact that in his published sine table, he only made 13 errors in the 7th decimal place greater than ±1 out of 5400 entries. The author guides us through Regiomontanus' tables and other astronomical works, as well as the astrological system that Regiomontanus used. We get some lovely spherical graphics, plenty of maths, and tables of values. I have a minor note here for future prospective scientific writers - it would be considerably nicer for the reader if every table of values or measurements contained a simplified diagram next to it to help understand what the values represent. We are taken through a variety of horoscopes, before the book moves back into a continuation of a prose biography of Regiomontanus. I was intrigued here by the mention that Regiomontanus left Hungary in 1471

perhaps on the rumours of a plot by Vitez with the King of Poland to remove Matthias as king that brought about Vitez's disgrace, fall from office, death, and seizure of property by Matthias

This was a lovely detail that I couldn't help but follow up. I ended up reading Bishop John Vitez and Early Renaissance Central Europe by Tomislav Matić before I found the time to finish this review.

I am ashamed to say that my knowledge of Hungarian history was lacking. And this book didn't disappoint. John Vitez was a man who was promoted by John Hunyadi, the famed Hungarian general. He rose to power, became a Bishop, was briefly excommunicated, was involved in the crowning of two Kings, and took part in two crusades that most people don't know about - the Crusade of Varna, and the crusade against the Utraquists. The Utraquists were a moderate subgroup of Hussites who insisted on receiving communion under both kinds. Vitez met Polish-Lithuanian Kings, the Holy Roman Emperor, and all manner of other notable people. Even Vlad III Dracula appeared in the story. More importantly for us, he was a great patron of the arts and sciences. He founded a university at Bratislava, and a humanist academy and observatory at Esztergom. He expanded cathedral schools and built large libraries. He commissioned astronomical and astrological works from Peuerbach and Regiomontanus. All in all, Vitez was a key figure in Renaissance humanism and education in Central Europe.


Coming back to Regiomontanus, Swerdlow writes that he was critical of other astrologers, but Regiomontanus believed that

the errors came not from the art of astrology but from relying upon poorly translated or corrupt texts, and motions of the sun, moon, and planets inadequately discovered by observations in our time [...] What was necessary, he said, was a restoration of astronomy.

It was quite common for astrologers to criticise each other (especially in aid of advocating their own superior expertise in astrology). However his call for a restoration of astronomy is something that is seriously taken up by the subsequent astronomers. It is indeed important to understand that the improvement of astronomy in the Early Modern era was pursued not just for improved navigation, calendars, cosmological understanding of the universe, but also for the far more common purpose - interpretation of horoscopes - which were used in decision making ranging from politics to medicine. At the same time, by this point in the book, we are convinved that Regiomontanus was a principal figure of the renewal and improvement of mathematical astronomy.


The chapter on Regiomontanus is succeeded by an appendix that contains numerous items:

  • Cardano's Horoscope of Regiomontanus

  • Peuerbach's Computations of a Lunar Eclipse

  • Erasmus Reinhold on the Alfonsine Motion of the Eighth Sphere

  • Explanations of sections of the Epitome

  • Criticism of Contemporary Astronomy Sent to Giovanni Bianchini

  • Oration on the Mathematical Sciences

  • Dedication of the Tabulae directionum

  • Bessarion's Letter to Pope Paul II concerning thge Error of Easter

  • Kalendarium: On the Problems of the Ecclesiastical Calendar

  • Prospectus of Books to Be Printed in Nuremberg

  • Preface to Disputationes contra Cremonensia deliramenta


So, the appendix to the chapter could have easily been a book by itself. There is a huge wealth in this collection of analyses and translations for expert historians of science. Doubtlessly you know you are one of them, if you felt your pulse quicken when you saw the list.


All in all, this was a thorough work on Regiomontanus. It was the best work I have read covering him, but it certainly requires a mathematical background and a sufficient interest in the subject to persevere through the long technical sequences.


Copernicus

The section on Copernicus starts by giving a considerable background of Copernicus' education, and provides an extensive study of Copernicus' influences, what books he may have read, and how he may have arrived at the idea of heliocentrism. Of course, if you hadn't realised, Swerdlow is a bit of a fan of Regiomontanus, and it is clear that he is persuading the reader of the importance of Regiomontanus' texts to Copernicus' work. The author certainly convinced me, helped along by his affectionate attention to the importance of Polish astronomy at the time. He mentioned an inventory of manuscripts by Grażyna Rosińska (1984) that I was unaware of, and promptly acquired (along with all the other history of astronomy books sold by the Polish antiquarian who had listed it). The author discusses quite a variety of aspects of Copernicus' life, including his involvement in collecting rent, overseeing baking, brewing and milling as well as his involvement in defending Warmia against the 1520 invasion of the Teutonic Order under Albrecht von Hohenzollern. He mentions Copernicus’ economic ideas, but he does not make clear that Copernicus analysed both inflation from debasement and the circulation problems caused by low‑value coinage - including the tendency of bad money to drive out good. Swerdlow thinks that Copernicus' idea came to him around 1510, and that he wrote Commentariolus in 1512 before circulating it anonymously in 1514. He points to the fact that the Almagest had not been printed before 1515 but that the Commentariolus and his copious notes in his hand-bound copy of the Alfonsine Tables show signs of sections being acquired from the Epitome of the Almagest, which had already been printed in 1496. This is doubtlessly the strongest evidence of Regiomontanus' influence on Copernicus' development of his model. The author ponders on an interesting subject on Copernicus' decision for arranging the planets. He argues that Copernicus must have thought of the Tychonic Geo-Heliocentric arrangement. He argues it must have been an immediate step, or at least an alternative option considered based on Copernicus eccentric model of the second inequality for superior and inferior planets. Swerdlow is convinced that Copernicus would have considered both, but wanted to keep solid crystalline spheres which weren't possible in the Tychonic arrangement, where Mars and the Sun cross spheres. He explains that Tycho later considered the two options but decided to keep the immobility of the Earth, rejecting solid crystalline spheres. I found it odd that in the same section he quoted Ursus, without mentioning in this passage that Ursus later also presented a variation of a Geo-Heliocentric model where the sphere of Mars doesn't cross the one of the Sun. No explanation was given why Copernicus couldn't have considered an option like the arrangement of Ursus. But the author does point out that in a Tychonic arrangement, inferior planets orbit the Sun in one direction, while the superior planets orbit the Sun in the other direction. It would have been nice to know if this neatness of separating the two "types" of planets was considered important for any astronomers later, but the topic doesn't seem to be mentioned further along.


Swerdlow thinks that Copernicus must have derived the heliocentric theory first, and only decided why he believed it to be true afterwards. He points to Copernicus' arguments in Commentariolus that:

  1. Every irregularity would follow from uniform motion by "fewer and far more suitable devices" (which is not true, Commentariolus used 38 spheres, while Ptolemaic vaiants used about 34-36).

  2. The distinction of superior planets [...] is determined by the order of the sphere of the Earth among the spheres of the planets (which doesn't explain why distinction is desired to be reduced).

  3. Retrogradations of superior planets occur when the Earth passes the planet near opposition, and of inferior planets when the planet passes the Earth, when closest to the Earth near inferior conjunction.

  4. There are other characteristic phenomena of the second inequality, in both longitude and latitude, as applied to particular planets depending upon the proportion of their spheres and periods to the sphere and period of the Earth (which is really here the most important argument for heliocentrism - a position that I see eye to eye with Swerdlow).


Albert Brudzewski (1445-1497), perhaps Copernicus'  greatest inspiration for diving into planetary theory. Great beard.
Albert Brudzewski (1445-1497), perhaps Copernicus' greatest inspiration for diving into planetary theory. Great beard.

Swerdlow wrote on (1) that Copernicus does not explain what he means by this phrase and seems to ignore the fact that we know that Copernicus miscounted the amount of spheres he used in Commentariolus, claiming he used only 34 when he had used 38. The author then argues that Copernicus' main motivating factor for taking up planetary theory whatsoever was the want to preserve uniform circular motion in the heavens, which is certainly well supported both by Copernicus' statement in Commentariolus, and by the extensive additions he later made when modifying the model to the version in De Revolutionibus. Swerdlow agrees with Michela Malpangotto's argument made in 2016 that Copernicus' initial motivation must have come from Albert Brudzewski's 1482 Commentariolum super Theoricas novas, a commentary on Peuerbach's text, which Copernicus would have likely come across between 1493 and 1495 while studying in Kraków. In this work, Brudzewski criticised the violations of uniform motionin spherical planetary theory, which Swerdlow believes to be original and unique in his time. However, Copernicus' discussion of the problem of the violations of uniform discussions is covered only briefly in the Commentariolus, which the author argues must be because he expected all the readers to be aware of Peuerbach's Theoricae novae and Brudzewski's Commentariolum.


How Copernicus acquired the ideas of Arabic astronomers, such as the lunar and planetary of theory of longitude of Ibn ash-Shatir or the Tusi couple, remains an unsolved problem. Swerdlow points to a Greek text by Byzantine astronomer Gregory Chioniades (1240-1320AD) which was in the possession of the Jewish scholar Moses Galeano in Venice around 1500. Giovanni Battista Amico was using the Tusi couple independently in Padua in 1536. This is the transmission route that is usually considered, although I am always left wondering whether a likelier route would have been straight to Poland through the Ottoman empire and the Islamic intemingling in Poland through Tatar networks. Transmission didn't have to come through single points of entry into Europe.


In the 3rd section of the Chapter on Copernicus, Swerdlow argues that Copernicus was most likely focusing on gathering observations from 1512 to 1529, and then wrote the manuscript of De Revolutionibus in the 1530s. His position is that the book was substantially complete in 1539 when Rheticus arrived, but continued to receive significant revisionsand additions for at least 2 more years. The book then dives into the theory and mathematics of De Revolutionibus, nicely translated into modern mathematics, which makes this a useful section for anyone who wants to study Copernicus' works but can't handle Copernicus' writing style which is quite alien to how things are done today. Swerdlow presents Copernicus' arguments for heliocentric theory in De Revolutionibus. At the start of this, he makes the bold claim that:

Ptolemy's arguments are primarily empirical and Copernicus' are, for the most part, not empirical.

He points to the fact that this is true even in the case when Copernicus argues for the same position as Ptolemy, such as the sphericity of the world. He also criticises Copernicus for misrepresenting Ptolemy by not mentioning the fact that Ptolemy had considered that if the Earth rotated, it was possible that the air would rotate with it and so things moving in the air would have no independent motion.


Reading the section on De Revolutionibus was a nice refresher, and it helped me to spot and memorise a few fun facts that I hadn't noticed retained when reading the original. Of particular note is the fact that Copernicus playfully considers a Saturn-centric and a Jupiter-centric universe when criticising previous astronomers who had not put serious attention into figuring out theordering of the planets. As well as this, Copernicus' reference to Martianus Capella (c. 410AD) is important, particularly since Claudio Leonardi's 1959 study catalogued 241 manuscripts of Capella's De Nuptiis, a number comparable with other leading astronomical textbooks. Capella had argued for a Geo-Heliocentric model, with the Sun orbiting the Earth, and Mercury and Venus only orbiting the Sun. This was clearly a serious contender with the Ptolemaic model for over a millenium. Ignorance of its popularity in the middle ages is widespread amongst historians and astronomers. The 4th section on Copernicus discusses the publication of De Revolutionibus in detail. This is highly important, as it is one of the key elements of Copernicus' life that is misunderstood in popular accounts of his life.


Swerdlow starts the section by asserting the reason for Copernicus' delay in publication. He states that Copernicus had two goals. The first was to derive new and improved parameters, which took him 17 years. The other goal was to provide proof for heliocentrism, as he had asserted he could in the Commentariolus. Swerdlow writed that:

[Copernicus] had no doubt that he was correct [...] but feared that hardly anyone would be convinced by his arguments, would even understand his arguments, and in this too he was correct. He was certain he was right, but knew he lacked the sort of proof that others would find conclusive or convincing for something that appeared not merely doubtful but impossible, even absurd.

Here Swerdlow is spot on, although one must still consider Copernicus' own statement in the introduction of De Revolutionibus, where he states that he had thought it best to circulate his ideas amongst experts, as the less educated might be less able to handle it. Swerdlow of course gives the deserved credit to Rheticus and Bishop Giese in persuading Copernicus to publish. Later he discusses Pope Clement VII's interest in the theory, as well as Cardinal Schönberg's letter to Copernicus, which urged him to publish and offered him money for an advance copy. The interesting link that Swerdlow brings in that I was previously unaware of was that Johann Albrecht Widmanstadt (1506-1557), who had lectured on Copernicus' theory in the Vatican on the request of Pope Clement VII, later became secretary to Cardinal Schönberg.


We follow the publication process, with Rheticus' Narratio Prima published in 1540 and reprinted in 1541, giving an overall description of Copernicus' model. Swerdlow writes that it is possible, even likely, that Rheticus consulted Copernicus, allowed him to read the manuscript, and received his advice and approval. I agree with him here entirely. The 1541 reprint of the Narratio Prima included a highly complimentary dedication from Achilles Pirmin Gasser (1505-1577), perhaps the first convert to heliocentrism influenced by Rheticus' work. Swerdlow provides a translation of the dedication in the appendix, a great addition.


Swerdlow considers that Osiander might have been a Copernican, but he states that he was not a helpful one. Osiander's idea to hold the idea of heliocentrism as a hypothesis is traced back to 1541, and neither Copernicus nor Rheticus thought this was a good idea (in fact, Rheticus called it a treachery!). Swerdlow later makes the reader also aware of Bishop Giese's anger at the addition of this preface, which he called an "impertinent deceit" in a letter to Rheticus on 26th July 1543. The printer, Petreius, claimed no responsibility over the preface and declined the request to change things. Swerdlow's coverage of Osiander's preface contains one sentence that is rather odd:

to this day, [Osiander] also has his devoted supporters, stranger still, who believe he had a more profound understanding of science than Copernicus.
Andreas Osiander is here to remind you that your ideas are just hypotheses, whether you like it or not
Andreas Osiander is here to remind you that your ideas are just hypotheses, whether you like it or not

I don't think anyone has ever argued that Osiander was a better mathematical astronomer than Copernicus. The question is rather about the Philosophy of Science. Osiander was an instrumentalist. Instrumentalism is a philosophical position that holds that scientific theories are tools for prediction and problem solving rather than literal descriptions of underlying reality. This is in contrast with realists, who argue that successful scientific theories genuinely describe how the world is, including its unobservable entities and mechanisms. For instrumentalists, Osiander's position will obviously be considered more philosophically mature. Certainly, Copernicus had by no means proved heliocentrism, as Swerdlow seems happy to imply without ever fully acknowledging the fact. So was Osiander's thought of holding Copernicus' work as a hypothesis, when it was indeed still a hypothesis, truly stranger still? Does Swerdlow think that ideas shouldn't be held as hypotheses when they are not yet proved? He never entirely answers the generic question, even when it becomes central to the Galileo affair he covers in the last chapter.


De Revolutionibus was dedicated to Pope Paul III, who was known for his devotion to astrology. Swerdlow asserts that one did not dedicate a book to the Pope without obtaining permission first. I hadn't heard this before, and with a bit of light research, it does indeed seem that there are cases from the time period where authors indeed received permission to dedicate a book to the Pope. I'm not entirely convinced that this means that this was absolutely necessary - I would like to see better evidence of such a claim. But certainly the lack of following controversy over the dedication suggests that either Pope Paul III was happy with or indifferent about the dedication. On page 309, Swerdlow makes a major error. He mistakenly types Agostino Riccioli instead of Giovanni Battista Riccioli, everyone's favourite mid-17th century astronomer and author of the great 1651 work, the Almagestum Novum.


After the author finishes discussing the lengthy publication and printing process, as well as Copernicus' death, he writes a 5th section of the chapter that discusses the reception and application of De Revolutionibus. He discusses Erasmus Reinhold and the creation of the Prutenic tables, a set of tables based on Copernicus' mathematics. The author asserts that while Reinhold used the Copernican model, he retained a geocentric viewpoint, and that ultimately he was the first to propose the Tychonic theory. He is largely right about this, although the Indian astronomer Nilakantha Somayaji (1444-1544) had already developed a mathematically similar hybrid system. Nilakantha’s model, however, included Earth’s diurnal rotation and did not form part of the European lineage that led to Tycho’s formulation. Either way, it is intriguing that Swerdlow mentions this here, but by the time he writes the chapter on Galileo, seems to have largely forgotten about Reinhold and the many astronomers who held similar views through the 16th century. Perhaps he didn't write the book in chronological order.


The Prutenic tables, despite being constructed by a Geocentrist, became a key work that popularised the Copernican model. Swerdlow writes that:

if the Prutenic Tables were preferred to the Alfonsine, as soon they were, it was because they were new, the one thing anyone could know and as good a reason as any.

Historians of science have many times looked back and tried to compare the differences in accuracy between:


  • the theoretically best fitted Ptolemaic and Copernican models

  • the Alfonsine and Prutenic tables

  • ephemerides based on the Alfonsine and Prutenic tables


Swerdlow sweeps this away with his statement, and he is not wrong. However there were certainly cases where astronomers did choose one or the other model based on which gave them more accurate results during some particular observation. The problem with this approach was that on any given day it was almost a coin toss as to which of the models would give the more accurate position of a certain planet. Of course we have various analyses that perhaps the Ptolemaic model could be more accurate in principle, or Owen Gingerich's analysis which showed that Copernican ephemerides had slightly smaller errors on average. But the point stands. There was a fashion for adopting the new model, and as Swerdlow notes, Tycho’s objections to Copernicus never turned on questions of accuracy. He simply did not engage with the empirical performance of the Copernican system in his arguments against it.


The author then vaguely covers the works of Magini and then moves on to Clavius. Here he makes a mistake when he claims that Clavius was the principal authority in the adoption of the Gregorian calendar. No, the truth is that while he was involved in the final decision, he only really became a more important authority on the Gregorian calendar after its adoption, when he defended it from detractors. The Gregorian calendar itself was designed by Aloysius Lilius (which the author clearly knew), the commission was led by Cardinal Sirleto, and the lead technical expert on the final panel was Ignazio Danti, a far more experienced and celebrated astronomer at the time, most famous for his construction of multiple meridiana for accurate observations of solar positions.


Overall the chapter is a valuable study of Copernicus, especially for technical readers. It adds information not available in other texts on Copernicus, and it really does a great job discussing the origins of heliocentrism, although Swerdlow stops short of discussing the many varied philosophical influences of the time, such as the extent of the influence of hermeticism on Copernicus.


Tycho

Considering the extent of the coverage of Regiomontanus and Copernicus in the previous two chapters, this chapter really feels anemic. Tycho was an incredibly prolific writer, doubtlessly the most influential astronomer for at least half a century, and he led a flamboyant and dramatic life that could easily fill a full TV series. Instead, here we get brief dives into his works and 30 pages on Tycho's instruments, with illustrations taken directly from Tycho's own Astronomiæ instauratæ mechanica. The British library owns a particularly nice colourful version that I love to peruse when I visit. The author of course dives into the measurements and the modeling details of Tycho, which will be valuable for anyone interested in the technical details. But he barely even covers Tycho's death, which he sums up as brief illness, without discussing the various speculations of his contemporaries that his fatal bladder or urinary‑tract infection may have stemmed from a combination of heavy drinking and the courtly etiquette that prevented him from excusing himself to relieve his bladder. Tycho’s chapter isn’t followed by any substantial discussion of his influence, his followers, the competitive geo‑heliocentric models, or the censorship and confessionalisation of his works - all of which would have been appropriate had Tycho been treated with the same depth the author gives to Regiomontanus and Copernicus. Still, the chapter will no doubt remain useful for technical mathematical historians who are less concerned with the urinary, human, and social dimensions of the story.


Kepler

Fortunately, the author decided to cover Kepler in depth. Although even here I wish he covered various topics in more depth. Early into the chapter, on page 463, he wrote that the reception of Disputation on Eclipses of the Sun and Moon:

was not favourable, was in fact quite hostile, because of conflict with Scripture.

It would have been kind to the reader to explain what happened here, and where the sources can be followed on this.


Swerdlow takes us through Kepler's works, dives deep into the mathematics, measurements and details. He discusses the different arguments for heliocentrism that Kepler presented in the books he wrote, which changed with time, and of course he discusses events in Kepler's personal life. The 2nd chapter covers the Mysterium Cosmographicum in detail before discussing Kepler's troubled association with Tycho.


Chapter 3 dives into Astronomia Nova. I'm jumping through what is a lengthy discussion of many important topics to discuss what I thought was an unusual position presented by Swerdlow. On page 527, Swerdlow discusses an argument for heliocentrism that supposedly is:

one of the most powerful proofs Kepler, or anyone, ever discovered, and he specifically cites it in the introduction. The argument is sufficiently complex that it may not have been understood by his contemporaries, and even today only Stephenson has recognised its importance.

The argument itself boils down to pointing out, with more detail, added complexities when the Sun is not at the centre. It also points to the fact that the Tychonic model has the superior planets moving around the Sun in the opposite direction to the inferior planets, another unnecessary complexity. Swerdlow seems frequently smitten by arguments that are both more mathematical and more opaque. I think it is very true that the argument presented "may not have been understood by his contemporaries" - I certainly don't recall any 17th century astronomers citing this as the argument that persuaded them. All in all, it builds a decent case for the application of Occam's razor, but it certainly seems that Stephenson and Swerdlow exaggerate its worth, particularly when placed against the arguments of opposing astronomers, whose arguments (which also appeal to Occam's razor) Swerdlow does not expand on in the book.


The author also seems to think that Kepler has a dismissive view of Tycho's model, which seems to be wishful thinking and an application of Swerdlow's own views. Kepler repeatedly, in multiple works, considered the Tychonic model a viable alternative, but voiced his own opinion against it.


On page 530, the author seems surprised that Kepler "did not also investigate a more accurate value" of the Earth's eccentricity. I think it would have been worth pointing out here that the quality of Solar observations required considerable improvements, which didn't come till the San Petronio Basilica meridiana upgrade designed by Cassini and built in 1655 that a convincing result could really be measured and confirmed by Riccioli and Grimaldi.


While discussing the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy in chapter 4, Swerdlow also discusses Kepler's excommunication by the Lutherans. Kepler was excommunicated after he refused to subscribe to the entire Formula of Concord, which included 21 doctrines that rejected positions attributable to all of the Christian groups other than the Lutherans. The author presents the case that Kepler's main objection was that Luther had believed in a real presence in the Eucharist, while Kepler was more aligned with the Calvinist position that the bread and wine were only spiritual, communicated through the Holy Spirit and received by faith as the body of Christ. Swerdlow draws a parallel to the Galileo affair, as the Lutherans ordered Kepler to confine his attention to philosophy and mathematics and stay away from Theology. On top of Kepler's excommunication there was also the other drama with the witch trial of his mother. Swerdlow tries to cover the very complex affair in just two pages, mentions nothing of the corruption of the initial court, which was both inclined against and implicated in the case against Katharina. But certainly the reader gets an idea that there was a large amount of accusations against her, the process was slow and problemative, and ultimately the trial ended when Katharina was shown instruments of torture, but refused to back down, making it clear she was not a witch, kneeling down, and praying the Our Father. The author speculates here that she would still have been tortured after this, had she not been the mother of the Imperial Mathematician, but brings no discussion of other actual witch trials, which generally do not provide a clear cut answer as to what the next steps would have been. The results of witchcraft trials varied considerably by region, reflecting differences in judicial personnel, legal practices, and the intensity of local witchcraft hysteria at the time.


The author later states that it is "not possible to review anything close to the entire Epitome", but certainly he does a great job trying. It is split into sections discussing Kepler's cosmology, arguments for Copernican theory, mathematical planetary theory, long-period motions of the Earth, rotation of the Earth, and theory of the moon. Swerdlow goes into plenty of details, numbers, equations and discussions covered by the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy.


An interesting idea that Kepler contemplated in the Epitome was that the Sun, sphere of the fixed stars, and the aetherial air of the intervening medium are analogous to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. He argued that since they are co-equal, they must each have the same quantity of matter. He thought the Sun would therefore be as dense as gold, the sphere of fixed stars less dence, more like water or crystal, and the aetherial medium must be far less dense. Based on this, he built a calculation that showed that stars were tiny (and he argued they were totally different to the sun). He further argued that if the Sun were placed where they were, it would appear bigger. They were supposed to be so distant that Tycho's failure to measure parallax should be explained away. Once again, I have not seen any astronomers from the period refer to this as the most persuasive argument for heliocentrism, but it is certainly intriguing in being one that is rarely mentioned amongst historians of science when discussing the early 17th century debate between heliocentrism and geocentrism.


Kepler's various arguments for heliocentrism are presented in plenty of detail. The author says:

It is worth noting in advance that only a few of Kepler's arguments are ones we would give now

but certainly a lot of them were stronger arguments in the context of the time. This, unfortunately, is one of my recurring problems with the book - the context is not presented well. The arguments for heliocentrism are all added in, and in Kepler's section, Galileo's telescopic observations are similarly added to the list of arguments (despite the fact that they were equally compatible with the Capellan and Tychonic models), but the arguments of the geocentric opposition are barely touched. So who was Kepler really arguing against? What were their arguments? The arguments certainly seem strong when presented by themselves without counter-arguments. But the beauty of Kepler's arguments was precisely that they remained strong and persuasive despite a lack of direct empirical evidence of Earth's motion before Bradley aberration was discovered


The section benefits greatly from the inclusion of numerous diagrams. Combined with modern mathematical notation, they make the mathematics underlying Kepler's planetary, lunar, and Earth theories far more approachable than in the text-heavy original or Glenn Wallis's 1995 translation.


Hans Georg Herwart von Hohenburg - chancellor to the Duke of Bavaria, patron of Kepler, and a scholar and astronomer in his own right. He frequently lent books to Kepler, and helped Kepler navigate Catholic academia
Hans Georg Herwart von Hohenburg - chancellor to the Duke of Bavaria, patron of Kepler, and a scholar and astronomer in his own right. He frequently lent books to Kepler, and helped Kepler navigate Catholic academia

For the section on Harmonice Mundi, Swerdlow provides a concise history of the concept of the music of the spheres, tracing its development from the Pythagoreans through the Greek philosophers and Roman thinkers such as Cicero and Boethius to its revival among early modern humanists. The author discusses what translations and books were available on the theory of music and music of the spheres, but also discusses the problem that there was no easy way to reconstruct what Hellenic music would have sounded like, one can guess that the corollary is that one couldn't fully recreate the Hellenic music of the spheres. One way or another, Kepler built a musical scale, linked a planet to each tone, and the ratios of the musical intervals represented the ratios of speed. Kepler seemed to have arrived at this idea perhaps as early as 1599. Swerdlow takes us through the development of this idea, including various correspondences, such as his request to Hans Georg Herwart von Hohenburg (1553-1622) to try and obtain Ptolemy's Harmonics for him in 1600. Kepler returned to his interest in harmonics between 1607 and 1609 at which time Herwart had managed to obtain Harmonics for him. Kepler also seems to have been influenced by Seth Calvisius (1556-1615), a composer, music theorist and astronomer. He was also one of the leading scholars of the age of technical and historical chronology, which according to Swerdlow was a:

field cultivated mostly by erudite lunatics.

Kepler recommended Calvisius' works to his readers in Harmonice Mundi. Calvisius greatly admired Kepler, but seemed to have had doubts about Kepler's ideas of consonance and astrological aspects.


When discussing Book 5 of Harmonice Mundi, Swerdlow once again dismisses Kepler's view of Tycho, saying that:

the acknowledgment of Tycho's hypothesis is little more than courtesy

which I don't agree with at all. A full reading of chapter 5 gives more of a feeling that Kepler is appealing to an audience that he states is mostly composed of Tychonic astronomers (and he makes it clear there are no Ptolemaic astronomers left!). This is not a courtesy, it seems rather that he is trying to reach a wider audience, and justify his ideas in more than one framework, which is a sound idea. Tribalism over models made no sense if one wanted to promote an idea without it being quashed. Crystalline spheres could be happily abandoned after Tycho's measurements of parallax in comets, for example, because there were strong reasons to abandon them in both Tychonic and Heliocentric models. Obviously Kepler still wrote strong words in support of his own preference of Heliocentrism, but he was also capable of working in other frameworks.


At the end of Harmonice Mundi, Kepler wondered whether the Sun or other planets might be inhabited, and Swerdlow points to a particular question that Kepler raised that suggests a strong belief in a Telos of creation, when Kepler asked:

For whose benefit do four moons encircle Jupiter and two Saturn as our single moon does our domicile?
Fr Paul Guldin SJ, Swiss Jesuit mathematician and astronomer, and protector of Kepler's library. Unfortunately he is now mostly known for accusing Cavalieri of plagiarising Kepler and Bartolomeo Sovero (1576-1629) in his method of indivisibles.
Fr Paul Guldin SJ, Swiss Jesuit mathematician and astronomer, and protector of Kepler's library. Unfortunately he is now mostly known for accusing Cavalieri of plagiarising Kepler and Bartolomeo Sovero (1576-1629) in his method of indivisibles.

Kepler's chapter finishes off with a discussion of the Rudolphine Tables, covering their mathematical development and the difficulties of publication. Even without going through the minutiae of obtaining Tycho's data and the calculations, the printing was difficult in itself. Kepler began arranging printing in 1624. The costs were supposed to be covered by accumulated debts owed him by the Holy Roman Emperor for his work as Court Astronomer. Emperor Ferdinand II refused to pay the debt himself, and instead charged the cities of Nuremberg, Memmingen, and Kempten. Only Memmingen paid Kepler within his lifetime. The work was originally to be printed in the Protestant Free Imperial City of Ulm in the Holy Roman Empire. Ulm was Lutheran, and Kepler had been excommunicated by the Lutherans in 1619, which is intriguing. But Ferdinand II insisted that the tables should instead be printed in Austria, so the job was turned over to Johannes Plank in Linz. In 1625, Ferdinand II ordered Protestants in Upper Austria to conform to Catholicism, or be expelled and have one tenth of their property confiscated. Kepler was exempted from the order, as was Plank, but it seems that Kepler's children were forced to attend Catholic services. At the end of the year, Kepler's library was briefly put under seal (except for the scientific books which were exempt), but this was reversed through the intervention of his friend Paul Guldin (1577-1643).


1626 was no easier. There was an uprising of peasants, who besieged Linz on 24th June. Linz was starved and filled with disease up until it was relieved on 29th August by Imperial troops. At one point in the siege, a fire damaged Plank's printing presses and destroyed a portion of finished pages. As the rebellion was suppressed, soldiers quartered in Kepler's house. Kepler was finding it impossible to remain in Linz, and moved to Ulm in November with the printing materials. Jonas Saur took over the printing. Saur had offered a cheap initial quote, but the complexity of the printing process meant that the costs quickly amounted to twice the original estimate. 1000 copies were finally completed in 1627, but sales were slow.


Swerdlow finishes the chapter on Kepler by estimating what Kepler should be owed today, if the debts owed him accumulated interest at 5% per annum and were adjusted for inflation - more than the present day value of Austria itself. He states that perhaps there could be some justice if the government of Austria used the owed money to support the complete publication in facsimile of Kepler's manuscripts.

Galileo

The final chapter dedicated to Galileo unfortunately is more problematic than the previous four, and it confirms Swerdlow's statement quoted in the preface of the book, where he said:

he had made no attempt to read the vast literature on all the subjects considered, and still less the non-technical literature on subjects hardly or not considered.

This is why the chapter unfortunately has some errors that we will discuss later in this section. If Swerdlow had focused less on the technical aspects and explored more non-technical studies of the Inquisition, the context of the Galileo affair, non-astronomical texts from that era, and the broader secondary literature of the period, he could have presented a less flawed historical account. It is particularly regrettable that the chapter did not receive sustained scrutiny from specialists such as Maurice Finocchiaro. Such engagement might have corrected a number of the assumptions and conclusions that are readily challenged by the available evidence.


The chapter starts by discussing Galileo's parents and his early years. His father Vincenzo is described as

brilliant, argumentative, controversial in speech and writing, notably skeptical of the supernatural and occult, and apparently somewhat overbearing

while his mother Giulia Ammannati is said to have been

a devout termagant who once reported her son to the Holy Office in Florence; as a widow of so many years, she only grew worse.

We can start to see a picture of where Galileo may have acquired his quarrelsome nature.


Swerdlow discusses how Galileo aimed to join the Camaldolese religious order, going so far as to become a novice, but his father Vincenzo forced him out, and brought him back to Florence before placing him in Pisa, forcing him to study medicine against his will. I don't know how the author later forgets about this, since he later tries to claim that there was no evidence that Galileo had ever been pious. The author discusses Galileo's musical ability, and his growing interest in mechanics and opposition to Aristotelian natural philosophy. He is also quite critical of Galileo, when he writes that:

Galileo was [not] a great mathematician or even a particularly good mathematician. His proofs of theorems in mechanics in the Two New Sciences are cumbersome, inconsistent, and often more illustrations than demonstrations of the theorems; he entirely misses simpler, more direct demonstrations and computational procedures obvious to his successors; there is little of originality considered as pure mathematics; although his intuition can be acute, very acute, he made any number of errors, some obvious, some not.

I found this characterisation revealing not only of Galileo, but also of Swerdlow himself. As a highly mathematical historian of science, Swerdlow is a connoisseur of the mathematical dimensions of Galileo's work. While few historians would dispute that Galileo was not the strongest mathematician of his age, most have attached less significance to this fact than Swerdlow does.


On the other hand, the author seems to defend Galileo's character on page 748, stating that Galileo:

did have enemies, some of his own making, for no one is someone who does not have enemies.

I think few people are as adept at making enemies as Galileo was, and perhaps Swerdlow was being tongue-in-cheek, as he expands on this, saying that:

"he did not suffer fools" "he was always trying to convince the fools to mend their ways, for which he expected them to be grateful" "he did not seek merely to refute his adversaries but to make them look ridiculous"

Swerdlow mentions that it is doubtful that Galileo ever dropped balls from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, but speculates that Galileo couldn't have resisted the temptation, meaning that it seems that Swerdlow is convinced of the story. As we all well know, Riccioli and Grimaldi's experiment at the Asinelli tower showed that heavier objects land before lighter objects when dropped from towers, which we now know is due to air resistance. If, as Swerdlow claims, Galileo had performed the experiment, he should have either known that they don't land at the same time, or he must have not performed the experiment very precisely. It is unclear which interpretation Swerdlow would have chosen, since he doesn't fully commit to the story. What he does do is press the idea that Galileo was refuting Aristotelian claim of direct proportionality of weight to speed of fall, which in all fairness would have been disproved.


The author speculates that Galileo:

could have learned the most important lesson in the method of the mathematical sciences from Ptolemy, for the Almagest was still the exemplar of correct, rigorous practice in the applied mathematical sciences. If so, we must also count Galileo among Ptolemy's heirs.

It is a shame that Swerdlow did not live long enough to see Ivan Malara's discovery of Galileo's handwritten notes on a printed copy of Ptolemy's Almagest in February 2026. Perhaps the psalms written out in the marginalia would have persuaded him of Galileo's piety.


On the origins of Galileo's tide theory, Swerdlow writes that in Paolo Sarpi's notebooks we find a note written in 1595 that gives:

the earliest statement of Galileo's later theory of the flow and ebb of the sea, the tides, by the annual and diurnal motions of the earth, which Sarpi may have learned from Galileo although his name is not mentioned.
Fra Paolo Sarpi OSM, a Servite friar and priest who had a close correspondence with Galileo. Historians of science still debate whether Galileo borrowed several ideas from Sarpi, or Sarpi from Galileo..
Fra Paolo Sarpi OSM, a Servite friar and priest who had a close correspondence with Galileo. Historians of science still debate whether Galileo borrowed several ideas from Sarpi, or Sarpi from Galileo..

It may seem a bit strange that seeing an idea in Sarpi in 1595, which isn't represented in Galileo's works till 1616, Swerdlow assumes that Galileo must have come up with the idea, and that Sarpi copied it from Galileo without attributing him. Swerdlow's position rests on the fact that the explanation is kinematic and doesn't use forces, which he argues is characteristic of Galileo's mechanics. There is an alternative proposal, such as in Ron Naylor's account that the idea was Sarpi's. Sarpi had studied the sciences extensively between 1578 and 1598. Naylor argued that Sarpi's theory differs from Galileo's take on the tides in a number of ways, suggesting this was not Galileo's idea. It is likely that Swerdlow here had taken inspiration from Stillman Drake - Swerdlow compiled Drake's multi-volume collection of essays, after all. Drake had argued (Essays on Galileo, volume 2, pp.99-100) that since Sarpi's notes were a short summary of the theory of tides, this was likely a summary of a theory he had heard, rather than evidence that he had developed it himself. If he had just heard the idea, this could perhaps explain why his account of the theory differed from Galileo's later formulations of the theory. So it is unclear to me whether Swerdlow would have been convinced by Naylor's article, if he read it (and it is unclear if he had). However, what Naylor did do, is he undermined Drake's assumption. Drake wrote in his essay that Sarpi's notebooks contain nothing else to suggest that Sarpi was a Copernican, while Naylor believed there was evidence in Sarpi's Pensieri that Sarpi was a Copernican by 1592. The problem here is that Naylor is also on shaky ground. He supports a part of his argument with the opinion of David Wootton, an expert on Sarpi. Naylor writes in 2014 that:

since Wootton appreciates that Sarpi studied Copernicus and became a Copernican, that removes any support for Drake's claim that any pro-Copernican argument in the Pensieri must be Galileo's.

However, from my own personal correspondence with David Wootton I know that he is currently still aligned with the position he stated in his 2015 book The Invention of Science. Here, on page 323 Wootton stated that:

Sarpi gives mathematics and clocks as examples of knowledge where we have certainty because we have made what we know, and astronomy as an example of knowledge where we can come up with a possible right answer (the Copernican system, say) but can never be sure that it is correct. Sarpi never shared his friend Galileo's conviction that Copernicanism was obviously right.

That is not to say that Sarpi couldn't have explored Copernican arguments, but certainly there is some tugging at the rug under Naylor's feet. According to Wootton, the exchange of ideas between Sarpi and Galileo is difficult to unpick, and it's very possible that Sarpi's view comes from Galileo and not vice versa. One thing that does seem likely is that both Sarpi and Galileo were potentially influenced by Andrea Cesalpino, a professor at Pisa. He taught philosophy, medicine, and botany, and became director of the botanical garden in Pisa (which I highly recommend as a place to sit in and relax while you are there. The buildings also hosted an incredible collection of dried mushrooms). Cesalpino had suggested in his Peripateticae quaestiones that the tides could be connected to the terrestrial motion involved in celestial trepidation. Trepidation was an idea brought by Islamic scholars that suggested there was an inequality in the precession of the equinoxes, which had been reformulated by Copernicus as a motion of the Earth's axis. Trepidation was abandoned by the end of the 17th century, but by applying Cesalpino's force-less idea to a different set of spheres, either Sarpi or Galileo first proposed their new tide model, which was entirely wrong. Swerdlow's discussion of the new star of 1604 is interesting, particularly when he discusses the Dialogo de Cecco di Ronchitti, a rather amusing work published anonymously. In it are two peasants speaking a funny local dialect and openly bad-mouthing Galileo's academic opponents. An intriguing fact about the work is that originally it contained two remarks proposing heliocentrism, but in later printings these remarks are altered and dismissed. Alessandro De Angelis suggested this was due to censorship of heliocentrism in his 2024 Galileo and the 1604 Supernova, but he clearly gets his dates wrong, censorship of heliocentrism had not officially started before 1616. Here Swerdlow presents a different thought - that Galileo was willing to abandon Copernicus when the evidence was opposed. In this case, the problem was that Galileo was arguing that the new star had no discernable parallax against the background stars, proving it was far above the moon's sphere. But if it had no annual parallax as he had argued, it could be seen as evidence of heliocentrism. Galileo wanted to win his debate on the new star, and was willing to sacrifice Copernicus to win his argument.


But by 1610 Galileo is willing to openly argue for heliocentrism. In the 1610 Sidereus Nuncius (which had an Imprimatur from a Venetian Inquisitor) Galileo writes how Jupiter and its moons:

with the concord of a single mind all together also complete great revolutions in the 12th year about the center of the world, namely, about the sun itself.

On Galileo's observations themselves, Swerdlow writes:

While it may be true that Galileo's discoveries with the telescope do not by themselves prove Copernican theory, including the diurnal and annual motions of the earth, they provide a great deal of evidence in its favo[u]r and against alternatives, and remove a number of objections

He also notes that:

while the evidence for Copernicus now has the greater fame, it appears that to his contemporaries, the evidence against Aristotle had the more disturbing effect [p.784].

This last bit is absolutely correct. Aristotelian physics was the very foundation of how the world was viewed, and undermining that, while scientists lacked the alternative that came later with Newton and others left academia in complete confusion. As to whether Galileo's observations provided a great deal of evidence in favour of heliocentrism? Well, I think that is agreeable at a stretch. Yes, the observations definitely destroyed the alternatives of the Ptolemaic model and traditional Homocentric models. But the Copernican model, like the Tychonic model, needed modification in exactly the same way to allow for the Moon's craters, Jupiter's moons, and Saturn's ears. These were not corroborating any predictions, and their addition was no more favourable to the Copernican model than to the Tychonic model. This is of course unsurprising, considering they were more or less the same model drawn from different stable reference frames. I don't quite know how the author managed to do this, but in the 2nd paragraph on page 806, he points to the fact that with the arrangement of Jupiter's satellites

problems do not arise in Tychonic theory

... and yet within a few sentences in the same paragraph he states that the discussed idea was "very good, and entirely new, evidence for Copernican, or at least heliocentric, theory". This is only true if by "heliocentric theory" he is including Geo-Heliocentric theories, by his own very admission. In general, Swerdlow repeatedly seems to want to treat Tychonic models as hot potatoes, occasionally mentioning them, but never touching them longer than he needs to.


Swerdlow also goes through the "Letters on Sunspots" in the same section, noting that this work was clearly Copernican, despite not setting out to prove heliocentrism. He describes the background, where Galileo was responding to a pamphlet by Christoph Scheiner (1573-1650) writing under the name Apelles. Scheiner claimed that the sunspots were many small planets moving about the Sun like Mercury and Venus, just much closer. Galileo rejected the idea in a work that was brilliant and witty, making Scheiner look foolish. Of course Scheiner later wrote the best scientific work on sunspots of the age in his 1630 Rosa Ursina, where he acknowledged that the spots are on the surface of the Sun, but only alongside extensive criticism of Galileo. Swerdlow writes that:

Scheiner had become an implacable enemy and, as a German and a Jesuit, he could be exceedingly unpleasant, especially after Galileo annoyed him again in the Dialogue

I'm not quite sure what Swerdlow means here by pointing out that Scheiner was a German and a Jesuit. I suspect there is a stereotype lurking in the background that I am not entirely privy to.


Then we get to the start of the Galileo affair in section 4. The section starts with the prophetic warning of Galileo's friends who pointed out that by moving to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, he would lose the protections that the Republic of Venice could offer him. Certainly, the Grand Duke seemed willing to defend Galileo in 1616, and Galileo was urged by the court not to go to Rome when he was summoned. However, this protection did not extend to the summons in 1633 when faced with the full anger of Pope Urban VIII. By contrast, Venice had not been willing to surrender Paolo Sarpi to Rome when Sarpi had been excommunicated in 1607. However, the context was slightly different, since Venice was already in a dispute with Rome since 1604, arguing over ecclesiastical property rights. Sarpi was defending Venice itself, and was a useful leader and writer.


The Galileo affair started with Galileo's Letter to Castelli. The background was that Castelli had been appointed a professor Mathematics at Pisa in 1613. Swerdlow mentions that on his appointment:

Castelli had been forbidden by the university to speak on the motion of the Earth

What he is referring to is Castelli's letter to Galileo on the 6th November 1613. Here is a translation of the letter, which I think should have really been included in Finocchiaro's The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History as valuable context:

On Sunday evening we arrived safe and sound, although somewhat wet, in Pisa. Immediately I went to pay my respects to Monsignor Reverendissimo Arturo, by whom I was received with every demonstration of affection; and in our first conversations he told me that I should not enter into opinions regarding the motions of the Earth, etc. To which I replied with these exact words: "What Your Most Illustrious Lordship has commanded me - for as commands I receive your wishes - has been given to me as advice by Signor Galileo, my teacher, whose every word I am still inclined to heed, especially since I know that in 24 years of lecturing he has never treated such a subject." To these words Your Lordship replied that sometimes by way of digression I might well touch upon similar questions as probable. And I added that I would abstain even from this, unless Your Lordship commanded me otherwise. And this was the first day's work⁵ of Sunday evening.  

The Arturo mentioned here was Arturo d'Elci, the superintendent of Pisa university. Arturo d'Elci was himself an Aristotelian writing openly against Galileo, such as in the 1612 Considerazioni sopra il Discorso del Sig Galileo Galilei, an Aristotelian work criticising Galileo's treatise on floating bodies. The work was dedicated to Archduchess Maria Maddalena of Austria, wife of Grand Duke Cosimo II de' Medici. The Aristotelian philosophers were cultivating the sympathies of the ladies of the Tuscan court in support of their position. Castelli had been proposed for the position by Galileo, and was a known disciple of Galileo, but d'Elci had authority over Castelli's speech, and was willing to use it.


It is with this background that we turn to Castelli's letter to Galileo on the 14th December 1613. Here Castelli detailed how Cosimo's mother, the Dowager Grand Duchess Christina of Loraine, coached by Cosimo Boscaglia (a professor of philosophy at Pisa) to cite Holy Scripture against the motion of the Earth. Castelli said that he thought he answered well to the objections. Swerdlow writes that Galileo:

decided the time had come to confront it in his own way.

But frankly, most of the arguments on scripture that Galileo had used were not really novel. The same arguments had been used in Diego de Zuniga's 1584 Commentary on Job and in the introduction of Kepler's 1609 Astronomia Nova. What distinguished the letter was the openly combative and dismissive manner in which Galileo advanced his position. He abandoned any pretence of intellectual caution or humility, directly challenging the competence and authority of his Aristotelian opponents. This is particularly evident in the following passage:

Let them sincerely tell me whether they think that someone in a scientific dispute who happens to be right has a great advantage over another who happens to be wrong. I know they will answer Yes, and that the one who supports the true side will be able to provide a thousand experiments and a thousand necessary demonstrations for his side, whereas the other person can have nothing but sophisms, paralogisms, and fallacies. But if they know they have such an advantage over their opponents as long as the discussion is limited to physical questions and only philosophical weapons are used, why is it that when they come to the meeting they immediately introduce an irresistible and terrible weapon, the mere sight of which terrifies even the most skillful and expert champion? If I must tell the truth, I believe it is they who are the most terrified, and that they are trying to find a way of not letting the opponent approach because they feel unable to resist his assaults. However, consider that, as I just said, whoever has truth on his side has a great, indeed the greatest, advantage over the opponent, and that it is impossible for two truths to contradict each other; it follows therefore that we must not fear any assaults launched against us by anyone, as long as we are allowed to speak and to be heard by competent persons who are not excessively upset by their own emotions and interests. [translation: Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History, p.52]

This last sentence must have particularly stung d'Elci who had just a month before tried to restrict Castelli's speech. Swerdlow seems to get slightly confused here, as it was not a problem that Galileo had stated that science should form the basis of interpretation of scripture. This was entirely normal in the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas. But certainly there was an issue that scripture was being reinterpreted by Galileo, a lowly Mathematicus, and with such irreverence to other philosophers and Theologians.


There is, however, an irony here. Galileo accused his opponents of resorting to Scripture because they feared confronting him on scientific grounds. Yet the prevailing scientific and philosophical consensus was, at that time, firmly against heliocentrism. His opponents therefore had considerable grounds for believing that it was Galileo who was challenging an established body of knowledge without having yet supplied the necessary demonstrations. However, in seeking to silence Galileo, his opponents seemed to fulfil his own damning description of them, appearing precisely as those who, fearing the challenge of an opposing argument, sought to prevent their adversary from being heard at all.


The matter was raised to the Inquisition by Lorini on 7th February 1615. Intriguingly. an anonymous report for the Holy Office raised no objections to the content of the letter, finding only three small passages "worthy of note". Caccini raised further charges to the Holy Office on March 20th 1615, which also included linking Galileo to Sarpi, now an enemy of the Pope. Swerdlow points to the evidence from Cesi's letter to Galileo on 12th January that Cdl Bellarmine held the opinion of Copernicus as heretical, but then stated that:

Still, the matter might have passed but for what happened at that time independently of Galileo's letter to Castelli. Early in January 1615, Paulo Antonio Foscarini (1586-1616), a Carmelite monk and professor of theology at Messina, published in Naples a Letter concerning the Opinion of the Pythagoreans and Copernicus ...

Swerdlow discusses Bellarmine's Letter to Foscarini, where he is critical of the line where Bellarmine says:

First, I say it seems to me that your Reverence and Signor Galileo act prudently when you content yourselves with speaking hypothetically and no absolutely, as I have always believed Copernicus spoke.

Swerdlow criticises Bellarmine, claiming that he was either being ironic, or he had not read their letters carefully. I read this slightly differently. Certainly, the language is clear that Bellarmine is not saying this sentence conditionally - they they would be acting prudently if they contented themselves with speaking hypothetically. It says directly that they have been speaking hypothetically, when they haven't. To me, this reads more as a diplomatic tactic to minimise what they had written already, and giving them a chance to save face by agreeing with him. Bellarmine wanted resolutions to disputes, not prompt executions.


Similarly, Swerdlow accuses Bellarmine of knowing next to nothing of Copernicus. We certainly don't have any direct evidence of Bellarmine having studied Copernicus' mathematics in depth, but we know he had for a long time been interested in astronomy and was no novice in that regard. Between 1570 and 1572 he lectured at Leuven and often covered astronomical topics. He had argued for positions that were considerably innovative at the time. For example:

  • he rejected Crystalline spheres, arguing instead for a celestial fluid. This is intriguing, as rejection of Crystalline spheres was a position required for supporting a Geo-Heliocentric model, and thereby opposing a lesser known aspect of the Copernican model, since Copernicus had been partly driven by a desire to support crystalline spheres.

  • he flirted with the idea that the heavens might be corruptible. He was lecturing just before the 1572 supernova, so he would be proved right imminently.

  • he thought stars could move independently of the heavens. This was particularly unusual, but it was a clear corollary of the claim that there might be a celestial fluid.

We know that Bellarmine retained an interest in astronomy. Swerdlow himself acknowledged on page 782 that Bellarmine had instructed four Jesuit astronomers to confirm Galileo's observations as soon as the Sidereus Nuncius was published. Bellarmine had just lived through the reformation of the calendar and Clavius' reformation of the Jesuit order into a scientific powerhouse. Astronomy was very much the topic of the day.


Swerdlow also misreads Bellarmine's statement where Bellarmine wrote about his opinion on whether heliocentrism was supported by evidence:

Third, I say that, if there were a real proof that the Sun is in the centre of the universe, that the Earth is in the third sphere, and that the Sun does not go round the Earth but the Earth round the Sun, then we should have to proceed with great circumspection in explaining passages of Scripture which appear to teach the contrary, and we should rather have to say that we did not understand them than declare an opinion to be false which is proved to be true. But I will not believe there is such a demonstration, until one has been shown to me; nor is it the same to demonstrate that supposing the sun to be in the center and the earth in the heaven saves the appearances, and to demonstrate that in truth, the sun is in the center and the earth in the heaven. The first demonstration, I believe, is perhaps possible, but I have the gravest doubts about the second; and in the case of doubt, one must not abandon Holy Scripture as interpreted by the Holy Fathers.

Swerdlow reads this as meaning that:

Any demonstration of its truth, and any required reinterpretation of Scripture, Bellarmine considered all but impossible, indeed, impossible: Copernican theory must be false because it contradicts the interpretation of Holy Scripture by the Holy Fathers, which must be true.

This is quite the opposite of what Bellarmine said. Bellarmine was pedantically clear here. If there was evidence of heliocentrism, scripture would have to be reinterpreted. He is also clear that the reinterpretation would have to be careful, and this is perhaps what confused Swerdlow. A reinterpretation of scripture as Bellarmine would have liked couldn't have made scripture "wrong". The whole point was that there was a thesis of two books of truth - the book of scripture and the book of nature. They could not contradict. This is the same idea that Galileo had appealed to. The point was that if scripture was reinterpreted, it would have to be reinterpreted in such a way that scripture would still remain true. This is precisely what Galileo had attempted to achieve in the Letter to Castelli.


What Bellarmine considered "perhaps possible" was evidence that appearances could be saved by a Copernican astronomy. This meant that he thought that a Copernican model could be used to predict the positions of planets in the sky. But this would not be a clear proof that the Sun was at the centre, since other models could also "save the appearances". Bellarmine did have "the gravest doubts" that the Sun could be demonstrated to be the center of the universe. And why would he not have had the gravest doubts at a time when Earth's motion lacked any empirical evidence? Then of course, this position is hardly controversial today, since we have abandoned the idea that we can figure out where the center of the universe is. Where Swerdlow is partially right however, is that it is very likely that Bellarmine had instrumentalist leanings. Instrumentalists believed that any number of models could save appearances, and consequently the mathematical success of any particular model did not, in itself, establish its physical truth. By that line of logic, it would seem that there would always be doubt, and scripture would always triumph. But even this is not quite true about Bellarmine's statement, as by using words such as "gravest doubts", he clearly does leave the option open that a truth about models could be found in future. And we know that instrumentalists at the time had been happy to accept that, for example, Venus orbited the Sun, or that the Medicean moons orbited Jupiter. Instrumentalists didn't usually hold all positions instrumentally, but what was reasonably doubted, was held in this state of doubt.


Swerdlow's discussion of the 24th February 1616 Consultants' report is problematic. He provides the original latin and a translation, which is accurate. He discusses the fact that the report judged the claim that the Sun is immobile and the center of the world was "foolish and absurd in philosophy; and formally heretical", while the claim that the Earth is not the center of the world and has motion was considered only "erroneous in faith". He explains this by saying that:

perhaps, very simply, the Father Theologians were particularly annoyed by Galileo's "remarkable subtlety" explaining the sun's standing still for Joshua. He had not said anything so startling about the motion of the Earth.

Swerdlow certainly tries to discuss what the role of the Father Theologians was. He writes that:

as "qualificators" appointed by Bellarmine under the authority of the pope, they had every right to pass such a judgment, it was their job to judge whether any point of theology or scriptural interpretation, any point whatever, was or was not compatible with the traditions and teachings of the Church. [...] The issue was individual and irresponsible interpretation of Scripture outside the tradition of the Holy Apostolic Church, and the issue was forced by Foscarini and Galileo - Foscarini, as he says, through a sincere desire for the truth, Galileo, I fear, through a sincere desire to be clever.

This is correct, although I do not think the criticism of Galileo is entirely fair here. But what Swerdlow misses and does not discuss is the wider context of this report. Yes, it was the qualifiers job to pass judgment on specialist topics. Yes, the issue was to do with interpretation of scripture, rather than deviation from any existing Church doctrines. But no, qualifiers were not the one making the final decisions in the Inquisition. From the Vatican's documents, we know that:

[Qualifiers] were a particular category of advisers (not to be confused with consultors) chosen from among the most eminent theologians and canonists residing in Rome. They were called upon to submit in writing, subject to examination by the consultors, the degree of error found in a book or teaching submitted to the Congregation for judgment.

The final decision was to be made by the Congregation. And this happened on 5th March 1616 in the Decree of the Index. Swerdlow paints the situation as if heliocentrism had been openly condemned as a heresy. But this is inaccurate. We have plenty of sources that point to the fact that heliocentrism was given an irregular canonical position that condemned it, but did not actually declare it a heresy. Let us look directly at the Decree. This decree is split directly into two. The first section lists "several books containing various heresies and errors", including books by Schlusserburgius, Usserius, Achillis, and Donellus. Then it entirely separately deals with the matter of heliocentrism:

This Holy Congregation has also learned about the spreading and acceptance by many of the false Pythagorean doctrine, altogether contrary to the Holy Scripture, that the earth moves and the sun is motionless [...] Therefore, in order that this opinion may not creep any further to the prejudice of Catholic truth, the Congregation has decided that the books by Nicolaus Copernicus (On the Revolutions of Spheres) and Diego de Zuniga (On Job) be suspended until corrected; but that the book of the Carmelite Father Paolo Antonio Foscarini be completely prohibited and condemned; and that all other books which teach the same be likewise prohibited and condemned; and that all other books which teach the same be likewise prohibited, according to whether with the present decree it prohibits, condemns, and suspends them respectively. [translation: Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History, p.149]

It is certainly clear that heliocentrism is being condemned. But it is no longer being talked about as a heresy, and it has intentionally been separated from the heretical texts listed in the first half of the Decree. Similarly, the Special Injunction of 26th February doesn't mention heresy, and uses milder language:

the same Most Illustrious Lord Cardinal warned Galileo that the above-mentioned opinion was erroneous and that he should abandon it.

Galileo himself wrote in his letter to the Tuscan Secretary of State on 6th March 1616:

[The Holy Church] has only decided that that opinion does not agree with Holy Scripture, and thus only those books are prohibited which have explicitly maintained that it does not conflict with Scripture.

Again in another letter to the Tuscan Secretary of State on 12th March 1616, Galileo is not saying that there has been any declaration that Heliocentrism was a heresy:

the decision taken by the Congregation of the Index about Copernicus' book, namely that his opinion does not agree with Holy Scripture

Similarly, Cardinal Bellarmine's Certificate on the 26th May 1616 again doesn't refer to heresy:

On the contrary, he has only been notified of the declaration made by the Holy Father and published by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, whose content is that the doctrine attributed to Copernicus (that the earth moves around the sun and the sun stands at the center of the world without moving from east to west) is contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be defended or held.

It was not unusual for the Pope, or the Inquisition to condemn things without declaring them a heresy. For example, in 1665 Pope Alexander VII condemned the proposition that:

A gentleman challenged to a duel can accept it, lest he incur among others the mark of timidity

This statement was condemned as "at least as scandalous", but was not declared a heresy.


These distinctions perhaps don't matter for most people who might care about the Galileo affair. Ultimately, heliocentrism had been condemned one way or the other. But Swerdlow repeatedly spends the rest of the book going out of his way dismissing scholars who have documented the claim that heliocentrism was declared a heresy as a myth, right up to the last paragraph of the appendix. Why does he care so much to argue for this, and why does he avoid discussing the use of the weaker terms in these sources?


Intriguingly, despite all this, Swerdlow shows a timid support for the qualifiers, suggesting that they just did the job they had been given. He later states on page 843 that:

Had the Father Theologians condemned astrology on the basis of Scripture - Isaiah 47:12-14 will do quite nicely - they would doubtless now be hailed as precursors of the Enlightenment.

I'm not entirely sure if this was supposed to be ironic, or whether he was unaware that the Church did condemn astrology, such as in the Papal bulls of Sixtus V (Coeli et terrae creator Deus 1586) or Urban VIII (Contra astrologos iudiciarios 1631). But of course, such a discussion would require a book of its own. Urban VIII after all hired his own astrologer, and the relationship between astrology and Church was pretty complex and influences went in two directions.


Swerdlow does not consider the Special Injunction to be forged, as Wohlwill proposed in .his 1870 Der Inquisitionsprozess des Galileo Galilei. Swerdlow writes that:

it corresponds well enough to the order of 25 February, the authenticity of which is not doubted, is written in the same hand and ink, and begins on the same page of the manuscript, to which neither can be a later addition. As further confirmation, on 3 March, Bellarmine reported to the Holy Office before Pope Paul V that Galileo Galilei, the mathematician, warned of the order of the Holy Congregation to abandon the opinion which he held up to this time

While Swerdlow had been dismissive of Bellarmine and the Father Theologians, claiming they knew nothing about Copernicus, on page 845 he acknowledges that Fr Francesco Ingoli was a competent authority on astronomy. Galileo credited Ingoli with persuading the Roman Inquisition against heliocentrism. Ingoli was also involved in applying the censor to De Revolutionibus, and here Swerdlow points to something I hadn't spotted before, namely that there were no censors applied to the physical arguments for Earth's diurnal rotation. Swerdlow muses that perhaps the book was shielded by its technicality. But I think that it is far more likely that Ingoli was well aware that diurnal rotation of the Earth was often held by Geo-Heliocentric astronomers, and was a considerably more popular position than heliocentrism itself. The author also discusses Ingoli's judgment on Kepler's Epitome of Copernican Astronomy which was added to the index in 1619, a valuable addition to the book, as this is rarely discussed to this level of detail elsewhere.


It is wonderful that Swerdlow mentions Riccioli's 1651 Almagestum Novum on page 853, proclaiming it as the most complete collection of recordings of observations of comets. He doesn't mention that Riccioli considered that they may be both sublunar or superlunar though, partly convinced by Scipione Chiaramonti's work on comets. Riccioli was a master of synthesis who tried to account for all the previous works he could lay his hands on. Swerdlow thinks it odd that Galileo objected to comets in the heavens, and later on page 866 mentions that Galileo had commended Scipione Chiaramonti's work on comets, but he never dives into the work itself. He had previously dismissed Chiaramonti, but clearly scientists found Chiaramonti persuasive, at least on some topics.


An interesting section on comets is Swerdlow's discussion of their motion. Kepler thought their motion was straight. Galileo thought all heavenly motion was circular, and thought therefore that the seemingly straight motion of comets was evidence that suggested that comets were not a celestial object, but rather an illusion.


When he gets to discussing Pope Urban VIII, the author spends a considerable amount of time speculating whether Urban might have been a Copernican. Ultimately he leaves the question to the judgment of the reader, for which I am grateful. He was not, he was an instrumentalist, a philosophical position that the author never seems to fully grasp. This is visible time and time again in the text that he wrote and in the summaries of his conversations.


Swerdlow was clearly aware of Cardinal Eitel Friedrich von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen's meeting with the Pope in June 1624, where the Pope said that heliocentrism had not been condemned as a heresy, but only as ill-considered (temeraria). The author also tells the story of a conversation between Campanella and Urban, where Campanella said that he knew German noblemen ready to convert to Catholicism, but they were outraged by the prohibition of Copernicus. Pope Urban VIII was reported to reply with:

"That was never our intention, and if it had been up to us, that decree would not have been issued."

Swerdlow seems to sweep away both events by toying with the claim that Pope Urban VIII had just forgotten what had happened before:

His Holiness, it appears, knew or remembered little of the events of 1616 beyond the decree of the Index, which makes no mention of heresy.

There is no reason he should have seen the Consultants' report from 1616. It was an internal report, and not what was published. All the official documents had not used the word "heresy" at all for heliocentrism. This wasn't a case of poor memory.


Swerdlow presents Pope Urban in 1615 when he was still Cdl Maffeo Barberini as a more sinister figure than in other texts. He makes a big fuss of the fact that Oregio used the word "admonished" when discussing an event where Barberini gave Galileo a monologue, presenting his position, that if both heliocentrism or geocentrism saved the appearances, then one couldn't claim one was real, since God was omnipotent and could have created the universe in whatever way he desired. Swerdlow also refers to Ciampoli's letter to Galileo on 28th February 1615 as Barberini's "warning" (p.1006). Other historians such as John J Fahie have interpreted the letter as an expression of Barberini's cautious, but broadly sympathetic position towards Galileo:

Mgr Ciampoli, another (Florentine) disciple then residing in Rome, writing 28th February, conveyed the assurance of Cardinal Maffeo Barberini that he had Galileo's interests at heart, and that it would be more prudent not to go beyond his role of Professor of Mathematics, as the theologians claimed to have the sole right of explaining the Scriptures. [Fahie, John J, Galileo: His Life and Work, 1903, p.156]

Ultimately Barberini felt his instrumentalist should be held, but he didn't think either realist side should be condemned. And it seems that Barberini's memory that he had not wanted the 1616 Decree is confirmed by the account of Buonamici written in July 1633, where he in fact states that Pope Paul V had been inclined to condemn heliocentrism, but had been stopped by Cardinal Bonifazio Caetani and Cardinal Maffeo Barberini:

Thus Paul V, instigated by the same friars, would have declared this Copernican system erroneous and heretical, insofar as it is contrary to the teaching of Scripture in various places and especially in Joshua, had it not been for the opposition and defense of Lord Cardinal Maffeo Barberini (today Pope Urban VIII) and of Lord Cardinal Bonifazio Caetani. [409] However, these cardinals argued, first, that Nicolaus Copernicus could not be declared heretical for a purely natural doctrine, without eliciting the laughter of the heretics, who do not accept the reform of the calendar of which he was the principal master; second, that it did not seem prudent to assert on the authority of Sacred Scripture in purely natural subjects that something is true which (with the passage of time and by means of sensible demonstrations) could be discovered to be false, for even in subjects concerning Faith (which is the principal if not only purpose of Sacred Scripture) it is frequently necessary to understand that it speaks in accordance with our abilities, otherwise if one wanted to abide by the pure sound of the words one would end up in errors and impieties (such as that God has hands, feet, emotions, etc.). Thus, these cardinals dissuaded Paul V from the ruling that the said friars had come close to extracting from him. [translation: Finocchiaro, Retrying Galileo, p.34]

Buonamici also wrote the same thing in his diary entry for 2nd May 1633:


Buonamici's diary entry from 2nd May 1633 [retrieved from Museo Galileo Gal. 25 doc. 45, c. 74r-v]
Buonamici's diary entry from 2nd May 1633 [retrieved from Museo Galileo Gal. 25 doc. 45, c. 74r-v]
In the time of Paul V, this opinion was already opposed as erroneous, and contrary to many passages of Sacred Scripture; yet Paul V was inclined to declare it contrary to the faith, but since Cardinals Bonifacio Caetani and Maffeo Barberini—today Urban VIII—opposed this, it was halted and settled [or kept in mind] because of the good reasons put forward by them

Swerdlow doesn't discuss Buonamici's account. Perhaps he didn't come across it, since as he said, he had not been particularly interested in pursuing secondary sources.


The author works through the arguments in the Dialogue, expanding on the mathematics of each idea. Swerdlow follows the tradition of Stillman Drake of having an incredible appreciation for Galileo's theory of the tides, despite it being not only entirely wrong, but less useful than what others had suggested for millenia. Swerdlow uses modern mathematics to expand on Galileo's tide theory, laying claim to its brilliance despite Galileo never having modeled it to that extent. He writes that:

Galileo was very proud, and very certain, of his explanation of the cause of the flow and ebb of the sea, which he rightly said was long sought and not yet found.

But no, the vaguely correct explanation - that there was an effect from the Moon and the Sun -had long been known, and in fact there are surviving tide tables based on lunar position and phase predating Galileo. These aren't as accurate as what we have now, but they actually gave predictions that would have been useful, while Galileo could model no actual predictions. In fact, even the little that Galileo could predict didn't match the data he had at the time, as we know from the fact that Buonamici supplied him with tide data that Galileo suppressed instead of discussing, because it didn't fit his argument.


What is good however about Swerdlow's discussion of Galileo's arguments in the Dialogue is that he does a great job of presenting the arguments from the perspective of Galileo himself. Reading the text gives you the feeling that Galileo must have had. You feel as if his arguments must inevitably persuade everyone. You understand that Galileo himself was convinced by his arguments, and he was certain that this work would give him a grand victory.


I found myself disagreeing with Swerdlow when he wrote on page 952 that:

Galileo’s neglect of Kepler in the Dialogue has provoked a good deal of criticism, and perhaps it is a pity, but considering the purpose of the Dialogue, it is hard to see how Kepler could have done Galileo much good.

Kepler's arguments were by far the best of the time, and would have improved the text. However, Swerdlow's following sentences do also ring true:

Kepler’s contributions to the proof of Copernican theory must be taken as a whole, not as they are sorted out today into those that have survived and those that have not; even those in the Epitome are barely known, and as a whole they would have been all but incomprehensible to Galileo’s readers even if he had known or understood or believed them himself, which for the most part he did not.

Pope Urban VIII's anger is pretty fairly characterised on page 955 as a result of Galileo's open support for Copernican theory and an insult to the Pope's wisdom. Swerdlow correctly rejects the Simplicio analogy as a cause as well as other less supported fringe theories. One interesting claim that Swerdlow makes about Urban VIII is that:

From the beginning he was more interested in punishing Galileo than in banning a dangerous book.

The author presents strong evidence that Urban was responsible for the summons and trial of 1633. Then of course on page 958 he once again claims that heliocentrism had been condemned a heresy, despite the fact that the 1633 condemnation uses the word heresy precisely when citing the qualifiers' report from 1616 and specifically stating that despite the fact that the qualifiers had made this judgment, the Congregation had been lenient. Once again, the Inquisitors themselves in the 1633 trial documents use milder language (while still condemning heliocentrism).


Swerdlow muses on page 965 as to why Galileo refused to admit that he had been a heliocentrist, despit an offer of a plea deal, and despite the threat of torture in the 4th deposition. Everyone knew the Dialogue was heliocentric. Here the author seems to get muddled. He argues that perhaps Galileo lied to the Inquisition because he considered heliocentrism to be God's truth, rather than man's truth:

that above all he could not endure, that above all was the reason for Galileo’s conduct, because of his integrity and because of his devotion to a higher truth

So we are somehow supposed to believe that he was lying due to the fact he had integrity. Swerdlow then claims that Galileo only eventually abjured under threat. But here he is dismissing what he already knows. Galileo had been claiming he had abandoned heliocentrism in his depositions already. And the threat of torture wasn't for the abjuration, it was during the 4th deposition. Galileo asked for only 2 modifications to the abjuration statement and both were granted.


Swerdlow once again shows a lack of understanding of instrumentalism on page 967, as well as a misunderstanding of metaphysics in general, somehow concluding God's omnipotence is incompatible with science and that miracles couldn't be possible, nothing worth going into since it is neither a position argued by anyone at the time (Galileo was pious himself and would not have agreed) nor does it represent the views amongst Christian philosophers today of whatever ilk. Swerdlow cites Gibbon for the dozenth time for good measure, persuading noone, before once again returning on page 969 to claiming that heliocentrism had been declared a heresy. Yet on the same page he states that "a threat of torture was for confession, not abjuration", so I really wonder where the words were Swerdlow's and where the editors may have added their own touch, since this contradicted what he had said on page 966.


I doubt Swerdlow was correct on page 975 when he claims that the Dialogue converted the world to Copernicus rather than Kepler. The actual consensus of scientists seemed to swing most to heliocentrism only once Kepler's model was extended by Boulliau, then verified by many further experiments, and I have seen little evidence that would suggest the public was persuading scientists of heliocentrism rather than the scientific consensus eventually making its mark on the population.


However, Swerdlow's sections on what happened after the affair contain some useful parts. On page 984 he discusses a debate between Liceti and Galileo that ran while he was under house arrest. He also covers discussions with Rinuccini and Pieroni, which Drake suggested might have included Pieroni observing the aberration of light a century before its identification by Bradley, although this is tenuous.


The chapter on Galileo finishes with his burial and description of his tomb.


Appendices to the chapter include Galileo's horoscopes, a discussion of Paolo Sarpi's theory of tides in his notebooks, a study of Simon Marius and Jupiter's moons, Oregio's account of Barberini's admonition to Galileo, and a section on what happened to Copernican Theory after Galileo, which is mostly good, up until the very last two pages.


On the last page, Swerdlow once again asserts that:

The Church condemned the central propositions of Copernican theory, the immobility of the sun, and the motion of the earth as formally heretical and at least erroneous in faith [...] There is no other possibility. After all the thousands and thousands of pages that have been written on this subject, some learned, some foolish, some absurd, some learned and foolish or absurd, these facts and conclusions are certain beyond doubt. One would think that would be the end of it. But it never ends and continues to our day

Well, what can I say, Swerdlow has at this point added another 1019 pages to the topic, he hasn't really persuaded me of his claims that supposedly have no other possibility, and he is egging me on to classify the work as one of his categories. I don't think Swerdlow was foolish, nor absurd. He was by all means most learnèd. But he also held some conclusions too close to his heart, unwilling to challenge them.


Conclusion

So what does this book do? Who is it useful for? I don't think an average reader will make it through more than a few dozen pages. Even for a mathematically proficient reader, handling the large amount of equations through over a thousand pages is going to be tough. Readers seeking a solid understanding of the Galileo affair and the early modern debates on heliocentrism will not find the latest scholarly research on the topic and will be misled by a text that is generally biased.


Where this text really shines is in its treatment of Regiomontanus; in the link from Peuerbach to Copernicus; in the in-depth discussion of observational and modeling advances; and in the highly technical defences of the heliocentric arguments of the time, which have recently been downplayed, often too unfairly.

This is a book that earns a place on the shelf of historians of science already well-versed in the Galileo affair. It is also a gem as a reference text. If you want to find the relevant measurements and modeling decisions for these key astronomers, they are well presented and chronologically organized. It is a vital tool for anyone with a desire to go beyond mere textual history and on to building models and simulations.


The real history of astronomy isn't comprised of just the few decisions of broad modeling choices, or switching up the centres of orbits. It also involves a comprehensive study of observations, additional observations, comparing these observations, synthesizing ancient observations, refining the data, aligning models with this data, conducting further measurements, and calculating distances, sizes, and similar metrics. Swerdlow understands this more than most authors on the subject. The book captures this, providing a genuine sense of the monumental journey to modern astronomy, which was far more than just a handful of individuals rearranging circles on paper.

Minor errors

P.44 par.2: 2 2/2?



Front cover of the new translation of Riccioli's Almagestum Novum

Michal J A Paszkiewicz is an independent historian of science, currently translating the works of Giovanni Battista Riccioli, who named the lunar craters, formulated the idea of the Coriolis effect, and wrote the most comprehensive astronomy textbook to date in his 1651 Almagestum Novum.


For Michal's take on the Galileo affair, you can watch his interview with Dr John Gruenwald here.

 
 
 

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